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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Defendant, Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
("Westinghouse"), appeals from a judgment, entered on a 
jury verdict, in favor of Plaintiff, John M. Ryder ("Ryder"). 
This action is based on the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621-634 (1994) ("ADEA"), 
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and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. SS 951-963 ("PHRA").1 
 
Ryder was employed as a staff assistant to the group 
controller for Westinghouse's Power Systems Group from 
1983 until April 6, 1993. Prior to assuming this position, 
Ryder had been employed at Westinghouse in various other 
capacities since January 7, 1963. On April 6, 1993, Lou 
Facchini ("Facchini"), who had been the group controller for 
the Power Systems Group since 1991 and who had 
"inherited" Ryder from the previous controller, terminated 
Ryder's employment under Westinghouse's permanent job 
separation program.2 At the time of his termination, Ryder 
was fifty-two years old. 
 
Two days after leaving Westinghouse, Ryder filed a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that Westinghouse wilfully 
terminated him because of his age. After waiting for the 
required time periods to elapse, Ryder filed his complaint in 
the district court on November 11, 1993. A two-week jury 
trial concluded with the jury's verdict in favor of Ryder, and 
with an award in the amount of $241,909. Westinghouse 
filed this timely appeal. 
 
Westinghouse attacks the district court's management of 
the trial in two separate respects, each of which, 
Westinghouse submits, requires us to reverse the judgment 
and remand this case for a new trial. We turn to those 
issues. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Ryder's 
ADEA claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 623(a), 626(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331, and based jurisdiction over Ryder's PHRA claim on 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
2. Facchini testified that he terminated Ryder only after trying 
unsuccessfully to place him elsewhere in the company. Westinghouse 
explained that by eliminating Ryder's position, as opposed to terminating 
him for cause or laying him off, it could offer Ryder a permanent job 
separation. The parties stipulated that under this arrangement, Ryder 
received, at the time of his termination, a lump-sum payment of his 
vested pension benefit amounting to $172,000, along with a payment of 
$391,027 in deferred compensation. By mutual agreement of the parties, 
Ryder actually continued in his position until August 31, 1993. 
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I. 
 
Admission of the "Chairman's Initiative 
Memorandum" 
 
Westinghouse first challenges the admission of the so- 
called "Chairman's Initiative Memorandum," which was 
authored by Michael Jordan, Westinghouse's CEO, and 
which contained allegedly ageist comments made by 
unidentified Westinghouse executives who were authorized 
to make personnel decisions.3 These comments were made 
at a series of meetings attended by Jordan, who became 
CEO in June of 1993, approximately two months after 
Ryder's "official termination." Also in attendance was Gary 
Clark, who was acting as CEO when Ryder was terminated, 
and who became president of the company after Jordan 
was hired. 
 
The controversial comments reflected in the 
memorandum were made at a meeting held on July 6-7, 
1994, the topic of which was "Employee Selection 
Development Rewards and Costs." App. at 54. Jordan's 
memorandum was distributed to "All Previous Attendees of 
Chairman's Initiative," and included his introductory 
comments that the summaries contained "some good ideas" 
and were "long, but valuable." Id. at 45. Some of the 
allegedly ageist comments included: 
 
       Participant: In many of our businesses we have an 
       older workforce. As a result, that 
       workforce gets a higher salary. 
       Additionally, our low growth businesses 
       can strain opportunities for younger 
       workers. Somehow we must provide those 
       opportunities. We have to get the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Facchini, who attended some but not all of the meetings, testified at 
trial that those in attendance were of the "general manager" level, who 
"ma[d]e decisions as far as hiring andfiring people." App. at 426. Based 
on this testimony, the district court noted that the attendees had "hiring 
and firing responsibilities." Id. at 430. 
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       "blockers" out of the way. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Participant: Westinghouse has been pretty 
       paternalistic in the past and we've ended 
       up with too much dead wood in the 
       organization. 
 
       Jordan: Yes, and that's a big issue because as 
       you squeeze the infrastructure, you want 
       your best talent to stay in the 
       organization. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Participant: We really haven't hired much over the 
       last 10-15 years. As a result, we have a 
       hole in terms of people development. We 
       don't have enough people in the 
       organization ages 30-40. Somehow we 
       have to anticipate what our requirements 
       are for people three years down the road 
       and be willing to hire people for the 
       future. 
 
       Jordan: That's the issue at many business units. 
       You have to have regeneration. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Participant: Blockers are always an issue but they're 
       less of an issue when you are in a growth 
       mode. Removing blockers is very 
       important when you're in a downsizing 
       mode because you don't have the kinds of 
       opportunities that growth provides you. 
 
       Jordan: People down in the organization know 
       who they are. . . . [W]e have to put 
       ourselves in a position of getting high 
       pots into more responsible jobs and move 
       the blockers aside. That's hard to do, and 
       no one likes to do it, but we're paying the 
       price now for our inability to do it in the 
       past. 
 
       . . . . 
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       Jordan: What we need to do as the leadership of 
       this organization, is force ourselves to 
       those standards so that the best persons 
       get into the right positions. An eager 
       high-energy person will get more done in 
       one month than someone who has retired 
       in place will do in one year. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Jordan: We seem to be missing the people in the 
       middle of the age range who have talent, 
       the willingness and the horsepower to 
       take on risky change projects. We don't 
       have those types pushing up from the 
       bottom. We have a kind of regeneration 
       gap here. We have to have those kinds of 
       people. Not only are these individuals the 
       leadership of tomorrow, these are the 
       people that create ferment down in the 
       ranks that pushes against the status quo 
       in the system. 
 
App. at 54-59.4 
 
Westinghouse contends that any relevancy that this 
document may have to Ryder's termination one year prior 
to the chairman's initiative meeting is substantially 
outweighed by its highly prejudicial nature. Westinghouse 
also argues that the document constitutes inadmissible 
hearsay. Ryder responds that the document was properly 
admitted as circumstantial evidence of the corporate 
culture existing when Ryder was terminated one year 
earlier. 
 
We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for 
abuse of discretion. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997). We will not disturb the 
district court's application of a balancing test under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403 unless it is "arbitrary and irrational." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At trial, Facchini agreed with Ryder's counsel's characterization of a 
"blocker" as "somebody who is preventing somebody younger from 
getting through to another executive level...." App. at 482. 
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Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted).5 
 
We have recognized that a plaintiff may offer 
circumstantial proof of intentional discrimination on the 
basis of age in the form of a supervisor's statement relating 
to formal or informal managerial attitudes held by 
corporate executives. See, e.g., Brewer v. Quaker State Oil 
Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 333 (3d Cir. 1995); Lockhart v. 
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 1989). 
We have noted that it is often crucial to the jury's 
assessment of whether the employer's reasons were 
pretextual and the ultimate question whether the employer 
intentionally discriminated against an employee. Antol v. 
Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996). Its importance 
seems to become ever more critical as sophisticated 
discriminators render their actions increasingly more subtle 
to circumvent adverse judicial precedent. See Sheridan, 100 
F.3d at 1071; Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 
1074, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
In resolving whether these comments were properly 
admitted, we can take guidance from our decisions in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We decline Westinghouse's invitation to exercise plenary review of this 
issue on the basis that the district court failed to make explicit its 
Rule 
403 balancing analysis. 
 
Our review of the record indicates that Westinghouse raised its Rule 
403 objection in its pre-trial pleading entitled,"Defendant's Opposition 
to 
Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Pretrial Statement and Offer of 
`Chairman's Initiative' Exhibit." Supp. App. at 1341, 1348-49. The basis 
for the objection was that the comments were not probative because they 
post-dated the termination by approximately one year and did not 
suggest a corporate culture aimed at eliminating older workers. The 
comments were highly prejudicial because they would sway the jury's 
focus from events at the time of Ryder's termination and invite the jury 
to react irrationally given the negative public opinion of corporate 
reorganizations. 
 
Although not expressly citing Rule 403, the district court addressed 
both concerns in ruling on the admissibility of the memorandum. App. 
at 131-34, 467. Based on our review of the record, we think that the 
district judge's analysis was sufficiently explicit here. See In re Paoli 
R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 457 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997); Sheridan, 100 
F.3d at 1076 n.10. 
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Lockhart, 879 F.2d at 54, and Brewer, 72 F.3d at 333-34. 
In Lockhart, we held that an ageist comment made by the 
senior-most executive of one of the four Westinghouse 
Credit Corporation divisions was relevant to the company's 
atmosphere or culture when the plaintiff was terminated 
approximately one year earlier. 879 F.2d at 54. Even 
though this executive did not occupy his post at the time of 
the plaintiff 's termination and did not comment specifically 
about and was not involved in dismissing the plaintiff, we 
reasoned that a jury could read his comment as reflecting 
a "cumulative statement of managerial policies" that had 
been effectuated by other high ranking company executives 
for "a considerable time." Id. We concluded that an 
executive of such stature in the organization was likely to 
be aware of the prevailing atmosphere even if he did not 
participate in a particular termination. 
 
In Brewer, we confronted the admissibility of Quaker 
State's CEO's description in a company newsletter of two 
new executives as "two of our star young men in their mid- 
40s. That age group is our future." 72 F.3d at 333. We held 
that this comment was a "stray remark" because the CEO 
played no role in the termination decision at issue and he 
made the remark nearly two years prior to the plaintiff's 
termination. Id. Nonetheless, we found it relevant as 
probative of informal managerial attitudes. This was 
particularly so because the remark was written by the CEO, 
and thus, was "not an off-hand comment made by a low- 
level supervisor." Id. at 334. We concluded that the 
question whether the comment was entitled to any-- and 
how much -- weight as circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination was for the factfinder. 
 
This is not to say that an ageist statement made by any 
corporate executive is relevant as evidence of "corporate 
culture," which would circumstantially prove a 
discriminatory animus. Rather, the court must, as we did 
in Lockhart and Brewer, evaluate factors pertaining to the 
declarant's involvement in recognizing a formal or informal 
managerial attitude, including the declarant's position in 
the corporate hierarchy, the purpose and content of the 
statement, and the temporal connection between the 
statement and the challenged employment action. 
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In the case at bar, none of the comments contained in 
the memorandum relate directly to Facchini's decision to 
terminate Ryder. They were made approximately one year 
after the fact by individuals not involved in the decision. 
Neither of the foregoing facts renders the comments 
irrelevant, however. The comments were made by either the 
company CEO or by executives with authority to render 
personnel decisions. Moreover, the comments were made in 
reflection on past managerial viewpoints at Westinghouse 
with an eye toward future change. If the jury were to believe 
that these comments accurately reflected a then existing 
managerial attitude toward older workers in April 1993, 
this evidence would make the existence of an improper 
motive for Ryder's termination more probable. Fed. R. Evid. 
401; Brewer, 72 F.3d at 333-34; Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1214- 
15; Lockhart, 879 F.2d at 54. See also Walden v. Georgia- 
Pacific Corp., No. 96-7045, slip op. at 23-25 (3d Cir. Sep. 
26, 1997) ("stray remarks" made by individuals outside the 
employer's decision-making process may nevertheless 
constitute admissible evidence of managerial atmosphere 
and a possible discriminatory intent). 
 
The remaining question, then, is whether the district 
court acted arbitrarily and irrationally in concluding that 
the relevancy of these comments is not substantially 
outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice or misleading 
the jury, given the statements' temporal remoteness and 
the fact that the speakers were not involved in Ryder's 
termination. Certainly, their relevancy is somewhat 
diminished by the fact that they were not made by the 
individuals who terminated Ryder. Cf. Abrams, 50 F.3d at 
1215 (negative comments by a decision maker are often the 
strongest circumstantial evidence of discrimination). Their 
relevancy is conversely enhanced by the fact that many of 
the statements (and seemingly the more controversial ones) 
were made by the CEO himself. Brewer, 72 F.3d at 333-34. 
 
In this regard, we agree with Westinghouse that a CEO's 
comments are likely to be reviewed carefully by a jury; as 
noted in Lockhart, "[w]hen a major company executive 
speaks, `everybody listens' in the corporate hierarchy...." 
879 F.2d at 54. Although he spoke approximately one year 
after Facchini decided to terminate Ryder, Jordan had 
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served as CEO since July 1993, approximately one month 
before Ryder left Westinghouse. He had a basis for 
knowledge of the existing managerial viewpoints during the 
relevant time period. As to the other participants, it is clear 
that they were discussing past practices at Westinghouse. 
 
In any event, we conclude, as we did in Lockhart, that 
these statements may have reflected a cumulative 
managerial attitude that had been held for "a considerable 
time." 879 F.2d at 54. Therefore, we cannot say that the 
district court acted arbitrarily and irrationally in its finding 
that any unfair prejudice did not outweigh the relevancy of 
the comments based on their temporal remoteness or on 
the fact that the speakers were not involved in Ryder's 
termination.6 
 
We also believe that the jury would not have been 
confused by the fact that these comments were made one 
year after Ryder's termination. They were expressly offered 
to illustrate the pervasive ageist managerial attitude when 
Ryder was terminated, and Westinghouse clarified this 
temporal factor on cross examination. Consequently, we 
conclude that the district court did not act arbitrarily and 
irrationally in balancing these competing interests in favor 
of admissibility. 
 
We also reject Westinghouse's argument that these 
statements constitute inadmissible hearsay. Ryder offered 
these statements into evidence as circumstantial proof of 
the managerial viewpoint on "blockers" that prevailed when 
Ryder was terminated. Thus, we find that the statements 
were not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We think likewise as to any prejudice resulting from the allegedly 
negative public perception of corporate reorganizations. Such a 
generalized view is too speculative to support the conclusion that the 
introduction of a document that Westinghouse contends in its brief 
evinces no age animus was unfairly prejudicial because it would cause 
the jury to act irrationally. 
 
7. For instance, Jordan's statement that "[a]n eager, high energy person 
will get more done in one month than someone who has retired in place 
will do in one year" was not offered for its truth. Instead, it was 
offered 
to illustrate the CEO's state of mind on the issue of unproductive (and 
seemingly older) individuals. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); see also id. 803(3). 
This reasoning applies to the other comments as well. 
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Even if the statements were offered to prove the truth of 
the matters asserted, we nevertheless would conclude that 
they were admissible as exceptions to the definition of 
hearsay. First, the statements made by Jordan at the 
meeting and summarized in the memorandum were 
admissions by the agent of Westinghouse. Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(D). Jordan was speaking as the CEO of 
Westinghouse to a group of Westinghouse executives about 
personnel matters over which these executives exercised 
authority. Thus, he spoke as Westinghouse's agent within 
the scope of his employment. Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1001-02 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
Jordan's summarization of the statements made by the 
unidentified participants presents a "double hearsay" 
problem. For these comments to have been properly 
admitted then, we must find each level of hearsay to fall 
within some applicable exception. Fed. R. Evid. 805. As we 
noted above, in summarizing these statements in a 
memorandum sent to all meeting attendees, Jordan acted 
within the scope of his employment as CEO of 
Westinghouse. Thus, his recitation of the statements is an 
admission by a party-opponent under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). See Carden, 850 F.2d at 1001-02 & 
n.6. 
 
We find this exception to apply to the actual utterances 
of these statements by the unidentified meeting 
participants as well. The speakers, though unidentified by 
name or specific title, were all Westinghouse executives who 
had authority to make personnel decisions. They acted 
within the scope of their employment in stating their views 
on the state of their workforce at the request of the 
company CEO. Thus, the sources of the statements are 
identified sufficiently to establish that they were made by 
agents of Westinghouse acting within the scope of and 
during the existence of their employment relationship. See 
Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 
F.2d 1358, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).8 Based on the foregoing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As to this level of hearsay, we find our decision in Carden to be 
distinguishable. There, we held that a supervisor's statement to his 
employee, who was terminated pursuant to a reduction in force, that 
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 analysis, the comments contained in the memorandum 
were properly admitted. 
 
II. 
 
The Jury Instructions 
 
A. 
 
Westinghouse next challenges the correctness of the 
following jury instruction: 
 
       In this area of the law, an explanation offered by an 
       employer for its treatment of an employee that is not 
       its real reason for such treatment is referred to as a 
       pretext for illegal discrimination. 
 
App. at 1235. Ryder first responds by asserting that 
Westinghouse failed to preserve, and therefore has waived, 
its objection to the jury instructions. 
 
If a timely objection preserved the issue for appeal, we 
exercise plenary review to determine if the jury 
instructions, as a whole, stated the correct legal standard. 
Otherwise, we may exercise our discretion to reverse the 
judgment only for plain error contained in the instructions. 
Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 435 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
       No party may assign as error the giving or the failure 
       to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto 
       before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
       distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the 
       objection. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"they wanted a younger person" constituted inadmissible double 
hearsay. 850 F.2d at 1002. At the heart of our conclusion there was the 
fact that "they" were not identified anywhere in the record. Thus, we 
were unable to determine if "they" acted within the scope of their 
employment in making the statement at issue. Id.; see also United States 
v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1081 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (emphasis added). We have interpreted 
this rule explicitly to require that any objections to the jury 
charge be made at the close of the charge. Seman, 26 F.3d 
at 436. It is clear from the record that while it objected to 
a separate portion of the court's instruction after the jury 
was charged, Westinghouse did not object to the sentence 
attacked on appeal. App. at 1244-45.9 
 
We find inapplicable the exception to Rule 51 that no 
objection at the close of the charge is needed where the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Rule 51 also requires that a party identify the objectionable matter 
"with sufficient clarity to give the trial judge notice of a possible 
error in 
the instruction." Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aenta Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 89 F.3d 976, 993 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Jackson v. 
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 485 (1996). 
 
Our independent review of the record here shows that Westinghouse 
never objected specifically to the instruction challenged on appeal. At 
the 
charge conference, Westinghouse objected to the inferential proof 
instruction, which read: 
 
       You may infer that Mr. Ryder has met his burden of proof if you 
find 
       that the four facts set forth above have been proven by a 
       preponderance of the evidence and if you further disbelieve 
       defendant's explanation for why plaintiff's employment was 
       terminated. 
 
App. at 1234-35. On appeal, Westinghouse identifies as the erroneous 
instruction a sentence found in the paragraph immediately succeeding 
the instruction attacked at the charge conference: 
 
       In this area of the law, an explanation offered by an employer for 
its 
       treatment of an employee that is not its real reason for such 
       treatment is referred to as a pretext for illegal discrimination. 
 
App. at 1235 (emphasis added). 
 
We conclude that Westinghouse's objection at the conference would 
not have alerted the district judge to the alleged error advanced on 
appeal. The former objection pertained to whether the inferential proof 
instruction would mislead the jury into believing that a finding of 
discrimination could be based solely on the prima facie case, in 
contravention of our holding in Seman, 26 F.3d at 435. Westinghouse 
contends that the instruction now challenged equated the disbelief of 
Westinghouse's reason with a finding that the reason was a pretext for 
discrimination, in contravention of the holding in St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
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 district court expressly permits the parties "to incorporate 
by reference objections made during the charge 
conference." Seman, 26 F.3d at 436. Westinghouse argues 
that the district judge granted such express permission 
toward the end of the charge conference, in responding to 
Westinghouse's objection to the use of the word 
"performance" on page eight of the proposed instructions. 
The court stated that "[a]ll those are noted.. . . And they 
are preserved every time it is done." App. at 1224. 
 
Our review of this colloquy in context, however, leads us 
to conclude that the judge was not granting the parties 
express permission to dispense with objections to the final, 
altered version of the jury instructions that were actually 
given to the jury. First, the reference to "performance" can 
be traced to an earlier Westinghouse objection, on pages six 
and seven, to the inclusion of "performance" in the 
instructions as "add[ing] an element to the case that really 
isn't in the case." App. at 1215. When Westinghouse 
objected to its inclusion again on page eight, the judge 
responded by noting that the issue was preserved. Second, 
Westinghouse's claim is belied by the district judge's 
invitation and acceptance of Westinghouse's objections after 
the charge was given. Id. at 1243-44. 
 
Having concluded that Westinghouse did not preserve its 
objection to the jury instruction that it claims is erroneous, 
we will review the instruction only for plain error. Chemical 
Leaman Tank Lines, 89 F.3d at 993; Seman, 26 F.3d at 
435. We will reverse and remand for a new trial only if the 
alleged error is fundamental and highly prejudicial, such 
that the instructions failed to provide the jury with 
adequate guidance and our refusal to consider the issue 
would result in a miscarriage of justice. Brereda v. Pickering 
Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
B. 
 
It is helpful to review briefly the evidentiary framework 
that applies in age discrimination cases based on a 
"pretext" theory. The plaintiff first must establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of age 
discrimination by proving that he: (1) is over forty years of 
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age; (2) is qualified for the position in question; (3) suffered 
an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by a 
sufficiently younger person to permit an inference of age 
discrimination. Brewer v. Quaker State Refining Corp., 72 
F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 The defendant then must rebut this presumption by 
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07 
(1993); Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330. Finally, the plaintiff must 
satisfy his ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the defendant's proffered reason is not 
the "true reason" for the decision, but instead is merely a 
pretext for age discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; Bray 
v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 990 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The plaintiff can meet this ultimate burden by proving, 
by circumstantial evidence, that the defendant's reason is 
"unworthy of credence." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp, 32 F.3d 
768, 783 (3d Cir. 1994).10 To establish such circumstantial 
proof, the plaintiff first must present evidence that each of 
the defendant's reasons is pretextual, viz, each reason was 
"a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually 
motivate the employment action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 
F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). This proof of pretext then 
may be combined by the factfinder with the evidence used 
to support the plaintiff's prima facie case of age 
discrimination, and from this union, the factfinder may 
reasonably infer that the defendant discriminated against 
the plaintiff because of his age. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.11 
 
Westinghouse contends that the district court instruction 
as to the final portion of the required proof was legally 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The plaintiff also may prove, by direct evidence, that a 
discriminatory 
reason more likely than not motivated the defendant, Armbruster 32 F.3d 
at 782-83, or that age played a role in and had a determinative effect on 
the outcome of the defendant's decisionmaking process. Miller v. CIGNA 
Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 588 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 
11. Of course, such an inference is by no means compelled as a matter 
of law. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. We have stated that the factfinder in a 
pretext case "is not limited to a choice betweenfinding that the alleged 
discriminatory motive or the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation 
was the sole cause of the employment action." Miller, 47 F.3d at 596. 
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erroneous. In its proper context, the pertinent portion of 
the instruction reads: 
 
        You may infer that Mr. Ryder has met his burden of 
       proof if you find that the four facts set forth above have 
       been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and -- 
       note that I say "and" -- if you further disbelieve 
       defendant's explanation for why plaintiff's employment 
       was terminated. 
 
       . . . . If you find that Westinghouse articulated 
       legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for eliminating 
       plaintiffs [sic] job, then you must determine whether 
       the plaintiff, John Ryder, has proven by a 
       preponderance of evidence that the reason or 
       explanation given by the defendant was not the real or 
       true reason behind Westinghouse's action in 
       terminating Mr. Ryder's employment. 
 
        In this area of the law, an explanation offered by an 
       employer for its treatment of an employee that is not its 
       real reason for such treatment is referred to as a pretext 
       for illegal discrimination. If you find that Mr. Ryder has 
       proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
       defendant, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, used 
       the elimination of plaintiff's job as an excuse or pretext 
       for discriminating against him on the basis of his age, 
       then your verdict will be for Mr. Ryder, the plaintiff. 
 
        On the other hand, if you find that the explanation 
       offered by Westinghouse Electric Corporation . . . were 
       [sic] legitimate reasons for plaintiff's termination, and 
       that plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of 
       evidence that age was a determining factor in the 
       termination of his employment, then your verdict will 
       be for the defendant, Westinghouse Electric 
       Corporation. 
 
        In making this determination, you should be aware 
       of the following: The burden of proving discrimination 
       always remains with the plaintiff, John Ryder, to prove 
       that he was a victim of age discrimination. . . . Your job 
       is to determine whether Westinghouse discriminated 
       against Mr. Ryder on the basis of his age. 
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App. at 1235-36 (emphasis added). 
 
Westinghouse asserts that this highlighted sentence 
equated any disbelief of its proffered reasons with the 
finding that the reasons were necessarily pretexts for age 
discrimination. Westinghouse states that the jury should 
have been instructed that under Hicks, a jury may infer the 
ultimate fact of discrimination from its disbelief of the 
employer's reason and its belief of the evidence used to 
establish a prima facie case, but the jury is not required to 
do so.12 
 
We agree that this statement was erroneous. We have 
stated that the factfinder in a pretext case is free to accept 
either or neither of the parties litigating positions as 
reflecting the whole truth. Miller, 47 F.3d at 597. That is 
why in Miller, we held that it was reversible error for the 
court to instruct the jury repeatedly that it had tofind that 
age was the "sole cause" of the adverse employment action 
for the plaintiff to prevail on his ADEA claim. Id. In the case 
at bar, the jury may have believed that Westinghouse's 
reasons were pretextual, without necessarily believing that 
age discrimination was the real reason. 
 
Despite this isolated error, we must read the jury 
instructions as a whole. Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit 
Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 56 n.13 (3d Cir. 1989). Much like the 
case presented in Lockhart, we find this solitary 
misstatement of the law to be offset by the court's repeated 
correct explanation of Ryder's burden of proof. 
 
For instance, in the sentence immediately following the 
erroneous sentence, the court clearly instructed that a 
verdict for Ryder was proper if the jury found that 
Westinghouse used the elimination of his job "as an excuse 
or pretext for discriminating against him on the basis of his 
age." App. at 1235.13 Then, in the next paragraph, the court 
instructed the jury that if it believed Westinghouse's 
reasons and concluded that Ryder did not prove that "age 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We note that Westinghouse requested no such instruction in its 
proposed jury instructions. 
 
13. This is nearly the exact language that Westinghouse requested the 
court to use. App. at 83-84. 
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was a determining factor in the termination of his 
employment," then its verdict would be for Westinghouse. 
Id. at 1235-36. Finally, the court again admonished the 
jury that "you should be aware of the following: The burden 
of proving discrimination always remains with [Ryder] to 
prove that he was the victim of age discrimination." Id. at 
1236. 
 
Based on our review of the instructions, we conclude that 
the multiplicity of correct statements negates the effect of 
the solitary erroneous utterance. Thus, we find that the 
court's instructions, as a whole, provided the jury with 
adequate guidance on the parties' respective evidentiary 
burdens, and we perceive of no miscarriage of justice that 
could have resulted. 
 Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
district court entering judgment for Ryder on the jury's 
verdict in his favor. 
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